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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WESLEY MULHERIN,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
VS.

)

)

INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY,

)

Case No. 17027

)

Defendant-Respondent.)

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a strict liability action instituted by
Wesley Mulherin for damages caused by accidental activation
of an air winch manufactured by Ingersoll-Rand Company.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Judgment on the jury's Verdict was entered by the
District Court on November 29, 1979 following trial.

An Order

denying plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial was entered on March 31,
1980.

Plaintiff appeals from both the Judgment and the Order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant Wesley Mulherin was at the time of
his accident an underground miner employed by Anaconda Copper
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Company at Anaconda's Carr Fork mine near Tooele, Utah.
Mr. Mulherin worked on an apparatus known as a ' 1 galloway",
a multi-level device which is used in the construction of
vertical mine shafts.

The various decks of the galloway

contain equipment used in drilling, blasting, removing debris
and cementing as shaft sinking progresses.

That equipment

includes certain compressed air-driven winches which are used
to raise and lower mucking devices which are suspended from the
bottom of the galloway known as "crydermen."

When in operation,

the crydermen are lowered to the shaft bottom by means of a
cable attached to one of the winches.

When not in use, the

crydermen are raised to a position directly below the bottom
level of the galloway by the same means.
Innnediately after Mr. Mulherin came on shift
October 29, 1977 and descended to the galloway, he and another
miner undertook to free a ten-inch diameter hose attached to
the bottom of a large sediment tank used to allow settling of
liquid pumped from the shaft bottom.
I

The sediment tanks was

located underneath one deck of the galloway and above the air
winches used for raising and lowering the crydermen.

When

settling had occurred, water was pumped from the tank to the
surface, and the remaining sediment was discharged over a side
rail of the galloway by means of the hoses into the bottom of
the shaft where the crydermen would later muck it into buckets
for removal to the surface.
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When the sediment-draining operation was not in
progress, the hoses

wer~

hung to the sides of the tank by

means of chains in such a manner that the tank would hold
water and sediment pumped from the shaft bottom.

The particular

hose being detached from the side of the settling tank and
maneuvered toward the galloway rail for discharge of sediment
into the shaft by Mr. Mulherin and his co-worker was attached
to 'the settling tank almost directly above one of the crydermenraising air winches manufactured by the defendant Ingersoll-Rand.
The practice of the miners who performed the sediment draining
operation was to stand on the winch in order to detach chains
holding the drainage hoses in place, then descend from the winch
to the galloway floor at that level and maneuver the hose toward
and over the rail.

During that operation the hose came in contact

with the winch's throttle-control handle, set the winch into
operation unexpectedly, and plaintiff's injury resulted.

Mr. Mulherin filed his Complaint against IngersollRand Company on July 27, 1978 alleging that the winch, and
particularly its throttle-control device, was dangerously
defective as designed and manufactured by defendant.

The jury

returned a Special Verdict and found that: (1) The product was
dangerously defective, that the defect proximately caused
plaintiff's injury, and (2) the product was being misused, and
that such misuse was a proximate cause of

-3-

plaintiff~s

injury.
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The trial court had determined that of the two
available defenses misuse, if proven, was a complete bar
to plaintiff's strict liability claim, whereas assumption
of risk, if proven, was to be compared to the product defect!
The court accordingly entered judgment of No Cause of Action,
The jury was not allowed to compare the contribution of misuse
to the product defect.

There was no finding of assumption of

risk.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court err in its instructions and

Special Verdict submitted to the jury with respect to whether
findings of misuse or assumption of risk are complete bars to
recovery or are to be compared with any finding of

defendant~s

fault in designing and manufacturing a dangerously defective
product which was a proximate cause of the accident?
2.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant

plaintiff a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence,
the newly discovered evidence being plaintiff's suppressed
subconscious recollection of the accident sequence elicited
under hypnosis following trial?

-4-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO APPLICATION
OF THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF MISUSE,
AND THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM SUBMITTED
TO THE JURY REFLECTED AN INACCURATE
VIEW OF THE LAW PREJUDICIAL TO
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
The recognized defenses to strict liability claims
in Utah are two and only two, they being "misuse" and "assumption
of risk."
fn. 5.

Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979)

The trial court instructed the jury regarding both

defenses.

Unfortunately, the instructions given were not proper

in their manner of application of those defenses to a strict
liability case.

In the trial court's jury Instruction No. 17,

the defense of "misuse" was defined.

In paragraphs 3 and 4

of the Special Verdict, the jury was required to answer special
interrogatories concerning misuse.

Both the Instruction and

Special Verdict form constitute error by the trial court for
the reason that there was no application of the principles of
comparative fault to the defense of misuse.

That such failure

constitutes error is clearly seen by examining and comparing
the Instructions and Special Verdict paragraphs dealing with
the defense of }!assumption of risk."

Jury Instructions 18 and

19, along with Special Verdict paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 do
reflect a proper application of the principles of comparative

-5-
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fault to the "assumption of risk" defense in a strict products
liability case.
This court, in its opinion recognizing strict liability
as the law in Utah, Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., Id., specified
"misuse" and "assumption of risk" as the two strict liability
defenses, and expressly declined to address the issue of application of comparative fault principles to either or both.
We need not-and do not-reach the issue
here, because of the unavailability to
defendant of either of these two defenses,
of whether comparative principles should
apply in strict products liability cases,
where one of these two defenses lies, in
order to diminish recovery by plaintiff,
or whether proof by defendant of one of
these two defenses bars recovery altogether.
601 P.2d 152

at 158, 159 (footnote omitted).

While this, court has not determined whether the two
defenses should be applied with comparative principles or not,
clearly they should operate in tandem, not separately, as
either total bars to recovery or as fault to be

compa~ed

to

the defect to diminish plaintiff's recovery as in other cases
of comparative fault.

In other words, both defenses must be

total bars or both must be compared.

In the instant case,

"misuse" was considered by the trial court to be a bar, and
"assumption of risk'' was to be compared.

Such an application

of the defenses violates the spirit of the principal case
addressing the issue, that being Daly v. General Motors Coru.,
575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).

The Daly case was cited favorably
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by this court on other issues in Hahn, and on this issue by
the respondents in their pleadings below.

In Daly, the

California Supreme Court stated:
If a more just result follows from [this]
expansion of comparative principles, we
have no hesitancy in seeking it, mindful
always the fundamental and underlying
purpose of Li [v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d
1126 (Cal. 1976)] ·was to promote the
equitable allocation of loss among all
parties legally responsible in proportion
to their fault.
575 P.2d 1162 at 1169.

The court went on to quote favorably

from the proposed Uniform Comparative Fault Act:
[,](a) In an action based on fault to
recover damages for injury or death to
person ... any contributory fault
chargeable to the claimant diminishes
proportionately the amount awarded ...
but does not bar recovery . . . . [Emphasis
added.]
575 P.2d 1162 at 1172.
The effect of the trial court's misappliation of
comparative fault principles is clear:

The jury found there

was a dangerous defect that proximately caused plaintiff's injury
and that plaintiff's conduct also was a proximate cause of those
injuries.

We therefore have a classic case for determination

of comparative fault, yet, by reason of the court's Instructions
and Special Verdict form, Mr. Mulherin is totally barred from
recovery.

The jury was not allowed to apportion fault, as it

would have in the event of a finding that plaintiff assumed the
risk but had not misused the product,

-7-
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It can be seen by examination of the cited cases
which support application of comparative fault to strict
products liability that courts are concerned with apportioning
fault among the parties by applying the degree of relative
fault found by the trier-of-fact to the amount of plaintiff's
damages.

The type of plaintiff fault, whether designated

"misuse" or "a.ssumption of risk" should make no difference
if the objective is to determine degrees of relative fault.
Neither should the fact that plaintiff's cause of action is
designated "strict liability" rather than "negligence" affect
the application of comparative principles.

Fault is the concern,

and the name applied to either party's fault should not affect
the outcome of the litigation.
By this appeal the appellant is urging upon the
court application of comparative principles to all tort
situations, regardless whether they arise from claims of
negligence or strict liability.

The defenses to strict

liability, "misuse" and "assumption of risk", are too little
understood in their meaning for the trial court's position to
be workable.

Conceivably, manufacturers could argue to a jury

that if a user assumed the risk of danger of a particular product
created, he was "misusing" the product because the manufacturer
never foresaw that the product would be used with such knowledge
of its dangerous defect.

Such an argument would effectively
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circumvent the spirit of application of comparative principles
to "assumption of risk" by the Utah Legislature in negligence
cases.

Comparative Negligence Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78•27-37

(1953).
The logical answer is a uniform application of
comparative principles to strict liability defenses.

A contrary

position is bound to create confusion and overlapping of the
defenses, which would frustrate the intent of the legislature
and the progressive weight and spirit of the law.

POINT II
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT AFTER
TRIAL, UPON WHICH APPELLANT'S
NOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GRANTED
In order for this court to appreciate the effect of
the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial, certain background information must be provided.
Plaintiff was the only eyewitness to the accident in
which his left leg was torn off by the accidental activation
of defendant's winch.

He testified at trial that, as he

recalled, he had been standing on the winch working with a
sediment tank drain hose and chains when the winch began to
operate.

As the trial progressed, it became apparent that

plaintiff could not have been standing on the winch at that

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

time for the reasons that because of the direction of rotation
of the winch he would have (a) lost the other leg and (b) come
to rest on his front and not his back side.

The.jury's finding

of misuse was based upon plaintiff's own testimony regarding
his recollection of standing on the winch when the accident
sequence began.

It was necessary to climb on the winch to

perform a part of the tank drainage task assigned to plaintiff before his accident, and plaintiff had been on the winch
for that purpose at some point in time.
Following trial, plaintiff was examined in detail
by a clinical hypnotist who found (see Affidavit of Charlotte
Morrow, Record) that the events which preceded the accident
were suppressed by plaintiff's conscious mind because of the
terrible emotional trauma of watching as his leg was torn off,
but that an accurate memory of those events was retained in
plaintiff's subconscious.

By means of relatively shallow

hypnosis that memory was retrieved, and discloses that plaintiff
was not standing on the winch, but had descended and was standing
on the galloway floor performing another part of the tank draining
task when the accident sequence began.

The observations of plain·

tiff's co-worker, Elmer Mondragon (see Affidavit of Elmer
Mondragon~

Record) are consistent with plaintiff's subconscious

recall of the accident sequence.
The affidavits of Morrow and Mondragon demonstrate
that plaintiff's accident did not occur in the manner he
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consciously thought it had and to which he testified at trial.
Detailed recall of those events extracted from Mr. Hulherin's
subconscious memory through recognized and scientific means
makes it quite apparent that plaintiff was not standing on
defendant's winch when the control mechanism was triggered.
The impact of such newly discovered evidence is obvious.
Should the jury have plaintiff's actual, though suppressed,
subconscious memory of the accident sequence before it, it
would be seen that such memory was, and the erroneous memory
testified to at trial was not, consistent with the physical
evidence.

A finding of misuse or assumption of risk, considering

that evidence, would be inconceivable.
At trial the only evidence that plaintiff was standing
on the winch came from the plaintiff himself.

This new evidence,

which had been locked in plaintiff's subconscious mind and
effectively hidden from both plaintiff and his counsel, clearly
demonstrates that plaintiff's testimony at trial to that effect
was the result of an imperfect conscious memory of the traumatic
events he experienced.
as being a far

The subconscious memory is recognized

more reliable repository of suppressed events.

Certainly, such evidence could not have been reasonably discovered
by plaintiff or his counsel.

Neither had any idea that plaintiffis

conscious memory was faulty until after the trial.

Such critical

and newly discovered evidence clearly falls with in the contemplation of Rule 59(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The primary

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

object of our system of justice is to find the truth, and
Rule 59 reflects that objective by providing, as this court
has often held, that where new evidence was indeed undiscoverable and could lead to a different outcome, motions for
new trial are to be granted.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully submits that the
District Court erred prejudicially and that justice requires
this court to reverse the Judgment and Order entered below
and remand to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this Honorable Court's decision.
DATED this 2nd day of July, 1980.
Respectfully submitted

ANTHONY M. THURBER
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
211 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-0181
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant were personally served upon
Moffat, Welling & Paulsen, attorneys for Defendant-Respondent,
261 East Broadway, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this
day of July, 1980.
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